I. Introduction
The recent declarations of some prominent European leaders about the necessity to accelerate the Europeanization of energy policy have not only demonstrated a new political impetus but also a renewed interest for the potentialities and limitations of the current legal basis for decision-making in the Union. 4 Using the 'enhanced cooperation mechanism' (Art 20 TEU), establishing a new European Energy Community Treaty or revamping the old EURATOM Treaty, are only some of the propositions which compose the energy policy debate today. Focusing on the substantive content of policies is indeed no longer sufficient to achieve the three objectives of competition, sustainability and security of supply. There is now a need to address in parallel the institutional and political impediments precluding the Union from going forward.
The risk of institutional paralysis in an increasingly diversified Union with 27 Member States is not a particularity of the energy sector. Defence, migration, taxation or foreign policy are all fields where the complex allocation of competence between the Union and its Member States and the remaining need for unanimity in some parts of EU decision-making continue to limit the Union's ability to implement common solutions. The risk of paralysis in an enlarged Union has been powerfully recalled by the French and Irish 'no' to the referendum for the adoption of the European Constitution which has been paradigmatic of Member States' reluctance to relinquish part of their sovereignty. Even in fields of shared competence where qualified majority voting does apply, low reactivity to events and changes as well as systematic political horse-trading across all questions continue to undermine the ability of the Union to respond timely and efficiently to the globalization of today's challenges. A logical conclusion from the last ten years of liberalization experience is that the time may have come to consider more flexible forms of integration allowing Member States to reach common positions in energy to commit on a regional or functional basis. Short-run differentiation at the sub-Union level has always been a reality of the European integration process and certain well-known successes like the Schengen agreement have allowed progress without shaking the constitutional order of the Union. History has shown that short-run differentiation can take different forms, both within and outside the framework of the Treaties. Within the EU legal order, the European Monetary Union has for instance shown that a system of opt-out clauses (in this case granted to the UK, Denmark and Sweden) may allow for differentiation even though it requires amendments at the primary law level. After the grand adventure of the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and the resulting constitutional fatigue, it might not be a reasonable path in energy. The Amsterdam and the subsequent Lisbon Treaty have nevertheless provided for differentiated integration through 'closer' and/or 'enhanced cooperation' which could be triggered by as few as eight and/or nine Member States. However, the complexity of this mechanism has so far prevented its use in practice. It therefore is legitimate to wonder whether differentiation outside the framework of the Treaties is not the right sort of low key legal framework 8 in a field like energy. Legal conditions for taking this path indeed appear less onerous than the conditions set for intra-EU closer cooperation and, by acting under international law Member States preserve complete control over the negotiations process and almost complete control over implementation and enforcement of the obligations they accept.
The objective of this paper is to explore the legal feasibility of establishing a new institutional framework a la Schengen allowing some pioneering Member States to commit and promote ad hoc common policies in energy escaping the formal and procedural requirements of EU law. We will use the term inter se agreement to refer to agreements concluded between two or more Member States of the Union following the Schengen model as this is the term traditionally used in international law for agreements concluded between some, but not all, parties in an earlier agreement. 9 The paper aims at providing the reader with a sense of the key issues and themes that will emerge if EU energy policy finds its legal foundation not inside but outside the framework of the Treaties. We will see that the key challenge from a legal point of view is to assess the substantive compatibility of such agreements with the existing rules of the Union and that short-run differentiation a la Schengen cannot therefore be assessed at a high level of generalities. We will thus take two areas where legally-binding cooperation at the sub-Union level is often called for: nuclear policy and security of gas supply. The possible substantive content of such cooperation will be derived from the economic and political literature before the legal feasibility is assessed. Section II will explore the different options for short-run differentiation within and outside the framework of the Treaties before proposing three criteria against which the legal feasibility of these Schengen-like agreements must be assessed. Section III will then apply these criteria to a projected inter se agreement on nuclear policy and section IV will proceed similarly for an agreement concerning security of gas supply. Concluding remarks will follow.
II. Short Run Differentiation in EU Energy Policy: Options and Legal Criteria
In energy, a natural tendency towards more or less formal regional cooperation for the regulation of cross-border trade has emerged over time. Under the umbrella of the European Regulators' Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), certain Member States have signed non-binding Memoranda of Understanding outlining the objectives and milestones of regional market integration. In 2004, the European Commission acknowledged this voluntary process of micro-harmonisation of the energy markets as an important interim step in the constitution of a truly integrated single market. The setting up of these so-called Regional Initiatives was primarily intended to facilitate an incremental harmonization of information exchanges, capacity calculations and optimisation of allocation. 10 The Regional Initiatives are proof that cooperation at the sub-Union level is not only needed, but also possible. Their scope is however inherently limited and differentiation on a more ambitious scale will require legal frameworks adapt to their obligations as members of the Union.
We note that differentiation between Member States is not foreign to the EU legal order. Flexibility, as a method of policy making, has become a permanent attribute of European integration.
11 There are plenty of instances where certain Member States found ways to 
Enhanced Cooperation (Art 20 TEU) -A Treaty-Based Flexibility Instrument
At first sight, the most obvious tool for enabling a group of Member States to go ahead in specific areas of energy policy might be the establishment of an enhanced cooperation, as provided for in Art 20 TEU and Art 326 -334 TFEU. The enhanced cooperation regime is the institutionalized form of differentiated integration, accommodating the willingness of certain Member States to pursue integration at a faster pace than others using the common EU institutions. 17 Remarkably, once introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty, there has not been a single instance so far where this mechanism has been used in practice. This does not imply that it has never been considered, let alone used as a threat in negotiations. In fact, it has been reduced rather frequently to a bargaining chip on issues where unanimity was required. 18 If applied rigorously and literally, the procedural requirements of the Art 20 TFEU procedure appear very restrictive. This is probably why this instrument has never been used. Reformed already by the Nice Treaty, the rules governing enhanced cooperation underwent some simplifying changes again with the Lisbon Treaty. However, the conditions for triggering enhanced cooperation remain arguably very restrictive.
First of all, the minimum number of Member States required to initiate an enhanced cooperation agreement has gone from eight to nine. Second, regarding the authorization 18 One example is the negotiation on the framework decision introducing the European Arrest Warrant. It has been blocked for a long-time by Italy. The other Member States used the threat of the introduction of the mechanism of enhanced co-operation to get Italy to agree to this piece of legislation. process, the initial authorizing decision shall be enacted by qualified majority without further qualifications (except in CFSP). 19 The final authorisation decision to launch the projected enhanced cooperation shall then be adopted only when the 'Council has established that the objectives of such cooperation cannot be attained within a reasonable period by the Union as a whole', a requirement which will not be met easily. 20 Thirdly, the initiation is lying mainly in the hands of the Commission: the Member States have to submit a request to the Commission, not to the Council, specifying the scope and objectives of the projected cooperation. The Commission then submits it to the Council and thus preserves a supranational review. The Commission remains the only gateway for launching a concrete legal text. 21 Regarding the content of possible cooperation agreements, there are two limitations: nothing can be done in enhanced cooperation that the Union would not be entitled to do itself, nor can anything be done in a different way from that which the Union could itself do. This is due to the fact that enhanced cooperation is governed by the same legal bases as those governing the Union, i.e. the same powers, the same instruments of action, and the same procedures. 22 Another limitation of this instrument is that the cooperation must remain 'within the framework of the Union's non-exclusive competences', thus enhanced cooperation would for instance not be possible in decisive areas of EU energy policy such as such as commercial policy or competition.
Against this background, it remains to be seen whether and how Member States will be able to overcome the procedural constraints of the enhanced cooperation mechanism. Despite the few advantages of the Treaty-based mechanism, such as the possibility to use the Union institutions or increased democracy and transparency, strong disadvantages continue to exist, particularly the rigidity of the procedural requirements even with the reformed Treaty. Other forms of flexibility might therefore be more adequate to enhance EU energy policy.
Reinforced Cooperation Outside the Institutional Framework of the EU: The Schengen Model
An alternative to the intra-Union closer cooperation framework is offered by partial agreements, i.e. Treaties prepared and concluded outside the institutional framework of the EU between some Member States under international law. This means that Member States decide to leave the narrow framework of EU law and conclude agreements among themselves. Hence, they exercise the Treaty-making powers they have preserved not only in relation to third-party countries but also in their mutual relationships. 23 international law the Member States preserve complete control over the negotiations process and almost complete control over implementation and enforcement of the obligations they accept.
The archetype of cooperation that started outside the treaty framework is the Schengen Agreement. It was established when a consensus on abolishing the passport controls at the intra-Community borders could not be reached. It led to the initial decision of Germany, France and the Benelux countries to cooperate and create between them a territory without internal border in 1985. 24 The Schengen regime is also the first institutionalized example of reinforced cooperation occurring between a number of Member States that is operatingafter its incorporation into the Union acquis -under the legal framework of the EU to attain a treaty objective. The most recent example of cooperation through partial agreement is the Treaty of Prüm on extended data exchange and intensified cooperation which was signed in May 2005 by only seven Member States. 25 The legal conditions for taking the route outside the common institutional framework are less onerous than the conditions set for intra-EU closer cooperation. Nevertheless, they are also subject to important legal limits which will be examined in the following section.
Legal Criteria for Assessing the Feasibility of Schengen-Like Agreements
As a general rule, the Member States are free to enter agreements inter se. However, this must be in full compliance with Union law. The legal limits to the Member States' ability to conclude Schengen-like agreements originate from the principle of supremacy of Union law. This principle is absolute in the sense that it encompasses national law as a whole, including constitutional law. 26 Clearly stated for the first time in the Costa Enel case it implies that once Union law exists, conflicting national norms are inapplicable. 27 For the treaty-making competence of the Member States this means that an inter se agreement cannot not be concluded where Union But how much Union law must exist, and is an actual conflict needed between the existing Union law and the provisions of the envisaged agreement to render it illegal? This is only one question raised by the intricate relationship between the supremacy principle and projected Schengen-like agreements. Thus there is a need to operationalize the supremacy principle in order to conduct a feasibility assessment. Criteria need to be identified in order to determine whether a conflict between the provisions of a projected inter se agreement and Union law would arise in a specific situation. 28 Following the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and legal doctrine the relevant criteria are pre-emption, primacy of Union law and subsidiarity.
a. The Criterion of Pre-emption
Pre-emption is the main criterion for assessment in the field of energy policy. It is still a loosely defined concept ranging from straightforward contradictions with Union law to subtle and hypothetical friction to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 29 However, certain key implementing principles can be found in the case law which actually leave substantial space for inter se agreements. For inter se agreements in areas of shared competence to be illegal, pre-emption requires either extensive 'occupation of the field' by means of Union legal acts (field preemption). 38 Extensive occupation of the field can be implied or potential, which means that even though there is no Union legislation, the Union may still have a duty to fill this gap. The very existence of this duty prevents Member States from acting. This happens for instance when secondary legislation expressly gives a duty to the Union to legislate on a specific issue of shared competence, which amounts to a quasi-exclusive competence (in the sense of Art 3 TFEU). In rare cases, secondary legislation also expressly forbids action by Member States. 39 However, pre-emption is most often implied which also precludes inter se agreements even when they do not conflict substantively with Union law.
40 Implied preemption arises when the field is covered so "exhaustively" 41 that there is no room for further Member States action. 42 This has been stated by the Court in Prantl: "Once rules of the common organization of the market may be regarded as forming a complete system, the Member States no longer have competence in that field unless Community law expressly 35 Art 2(2) TFEU reads: "When the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the Member States in a specific area, the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area. The Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence. The Member States shall again exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising its competence." 36 As pointed out by Waelbroeck (1982), supra note 4: "the essential problem here is to define the scope of the Community competence". Emphasis added. 45 This means that secondary legislation, e.g. a Directive or Regulation, pre-empts any agreement falling within its scopes. Member States are precluded from concluding agreements containing conditions that are more restrictive, detailed or simply different than those laid down in the secondary legislation in question. In this case again, implied pre-emption of a specified field has similar effects as an exclusive competence as defined in Given the proliferation of secondary Union law in many fields of shared competence (energy included), the combination of actual and potential 'occupation of the field' very restrictive of Member States' treaty-making powers. In reality, this is a situation which has to be assessed case-by-case and "should not be assumed too lightly". 47 Assessing 'exhaustion' indeed requires a thorough understanding of a particular market and subtle judgment of the extent of Union legislation coverage. We note that the 'exhaustion' argument has almost only been raised by the Court in the case of agricultural markets and that most markets in Europe are not covered as extensively. 48 The 'field' itself is not a clearly defined concept as the Court has sometimes used the argument of field pre-emption to assess the allocation of competence on an area covered by only one article of a Directive. In case of shared competences and non-exhaustive occupation of the field the area covered by the projected inter se agreement as compared to the existing rules of Union law needs to be defined. This is why the legal feasibility of Schengen-like agreements cannot be assessed at a high level of generalities. The problem then becomes to assess the substantive compatibility of the projected inter se agreement with the existing rules and objectives in this precise area of Union law. In the case of direct conflict, the inter se agreement would be illegal, which is the essence of the supremacy principle. 50 This could happen for instance when certain provisions of the inter se agreement are intended to limit the impact of existing secondary law. 51 Once a conflict is found to exist, there is a qualitative assessment to be done on the intensity of this conflict vis a vis the rules or the objectives of secondary Union law. 52 In the case of an absence of relevant rules, compliance of the inter se agreement with the stated objectives of Union law is critical. 53 Here the Gallaher case is very illustrative. The case was about possible stricter regulations adopted at national level, which were contested. As Article 3 (3) of the Directive 89/622 concerning the labelling of tobacco products required that health warnings should cover "at least 4 % of the corresponding surface", the British government tightened the obligations of manufacturers by stipulating that the specific warning ought to cover 6% of the surfaces on which they were printed. The Court allowed the stricter measure based on a broad interpretation of the wording of Art 3.
In practice, a sliding scale must be used as some minor, hypothetical or temporary conflict could for instance be accepted. Such an approach is indeed necessary as there are grey areas in practice between the extreme case where Member States can legislate freely as long as there is no direct conflict with existing Union law and when they are fully preempted due to exhaustive occupation of the field. In the case of absence of conflict, the last step of the pre-emption analysis requires assessing the impact of the projected inter se agreement on the proper functioning of the Union system and the current dynamics of integration. 
b. Primacy of Union Law
The second criterion to be assessed is the substantive compatibility between the future inter se agreement and general rules of Union law. Even if the inter se agreement does not affect the legal rights of other Member States, it cannot conflict in substance with Union law. This safeguard is intended to guarantee stability and uniform application of Union law. It directly derives from the Member States' duty of sincere cooperation (former Art 10 EC, now Art 4(3) TEU). 59 As a result, inter-governmental cooperation established by a Treaty cannot be used as an argument to impede the development of policy at the Union level. 60 In practice, a typical incompatibility which may arise with general principles of Union law is related to discrimination on grounds of nationality. Such discrimination seems almost inherent to the existence of inter se agreements to which only some Member States participate. It does not mean that benefits cannot be enjoyed exclusively by the Member States signing the agreement but that undertakings of other Member States should not arbitrarily be excluded. In our case, state aid and competition rules will also have to be taken into account in addition to non-discrimination as an inter se agreement should not distort competition in the internal energy market.
Where possible conflicts are foreseen, it is suggested to insert a conflict rule in the projected inter se agreements, such as it has been done e.g. in Art 134 of the Schengen Convention (1990): "the provisions of this Convention shall apply only in so far as they are compatible with Community law". Such a clause would contribute to show good faith on the part of Member States vis-à-vis their duty of sincere cooperation. We note that the inter se agreement would have more chance to be seen as lawful if it is expressly presented as an interim agreement, preparing the field for further integration at the Union level, thus not a separate and rival cooperation regime, which would run counter to the Member States duty of sincere cooperation. 
c. Principle of Subsidiarity
The principle of subsidiarity applies in fields of shared competence. Legal doctrine on the principle of subsidiarity is nearly exclusively focused on the question of whether the Union or the Member States should act. 62 Given the special qualities of Union law (e.g. higher transparency in decision-making 63 or a more effective compliance system), inter se agreements should generally be considered less effective and therefore Union law should be preferred "in the name of subsidiarity." 64 This means in practice that, where action at Union level is in view of the scale of the problem marginally less appropriate than an inter se agreement between Member States, Union action should be preferred to the conclusion of an inter se agreement. This is in a way mirroring the former Amsterdam Protocol on subsidiarity which stated that "action at Community level would produce clear benefits by reason of its scale or effects compared with action at the level of the Member States." Indeed, the application of the principle of subsidiarity to inter se agreements means that Member States' actions through inter se agreements should produce clear benefits compared with action at the level of the Union to be legal.
The 'value-added' test of inter se agreement compared to Union action is inextricably linked to the political feasibility of action at Union level. Thus, the determination of the ability of the Union to act relies on the ex ante ability to reach unanimity or success through Qualified Majority Voting (QMV). Inter se agreements should thus be particularly suitable in the case where e.g. an agreement involving a few neighbouring Member States on a highly localized issue and a contrario is not be suitable when strong externalities on other (noncontracting) Member States exist.
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III. Towards Short-Run Differentiation Outside the Framework of the Treaties in Nuclear: An Early Assessment
There are two main drivers for renewed support for nuclear power in several Member States: the need for secure electricity supply and the need to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG thereafter) emissions. 66 The potential impact of nuclear on security of supply and GHG emissions has been quoted on several instances by the Commission, for instance in its Second Strategic Energy Review (2008) . 67 Today several countries (such as the UK, Italy and Romania) are thus implementing or considering a long-term net growth in nuclear capacity but several others (including i.e. Ireland and Austria) remain resolutely opposed. It is then unlikely that Europe will be able to "speak with one voice" on matters of electricity generation mix and nuclear power, an exclusive competence of the Member States (Art 194(2) TFEU). While there is a widespread sense that handling key aspects of nuclear policy at the European level could have real merit, the political realities strongly militate against such an approach. The very slow process towards the enactment of the Council Directive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community framework for the safety of nuclear installations showed again how reluctant many Member States are to pool any national control over the opening and operation of their nuclear industries in the interests of a Europe-wide regulation. This is why the possibilities for legally-binding agreements at the sub-Union level and outside the framework of the Treaties need to be investigated for nuclear energy.
Stronger cooperation among pro-nuclear countries would aim at ensuring increased cooperation in the fuel cycle, including progress towards implementation of disposal of highlevel radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. Increased cooperation between national regulators is also needed so that the new designs of reactors are available for construction under an effective and efficient regulatory system. 68 Some areas for cooperation have for instance been defined in the Conclusions of the 4th plenary meeting of the European Nuclear Energy Forum (Prague, 28-29 May 2009).
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Member States' capability to further such collaboration remains however bound by a number of specific obligations on how they act with respect to there nuclear industry. Most importantly, as members of the EU, these Member States are subject to EU law and must comply with the Directives and Regulations made under the EURATOM Treaty. 70 The Treaty This section explores whether a legally-binding international law agreement a la Schengen among a few Member States would be a plus and indeed feasible from a legal point of view, as a preparatory step for improvement at the Union level. It will for this purpose study the legal feasibility (against the criteria defined in Part II, namely the preemption of Treaty competence, the primacy of EU law and the principle of subsidiarity) of three possible areas of cooperation at the sub-Union level:
Clarifying Market Rules for Nuclear Investors and Operators: Rationale and Legal Feasibility a. Content of the Proposition
An inter se agreement could clarify market rules for nuclear investors and operators on two core pieces.
First, a transparent and user friendly 'non-binding competition policy handbook' on the design and use of long-term electricity contracts could be agreed on. In the new European competitive energy paradigm, large and stable spot markets should be liquid enough to enable firms to sink high fixed-cost investments based on reliable investment signals. Yet, European spot markets remain under-developed. 72 In the present situation, long-term contracts help mitigate some market risks by providing an insurance device which will also helps secure funds with investment banks under project financing structures.
73 This is In the specific field of nuclear energy, some legal uncertainties appear due to the fact that the Aarhus Convention was signed under the EC Treaty and not under the EURATOM Treaty (DG TREN website). We note however that fields covered by the Aarhus convention do not a priori require more cooperation among Member States (except maybe on sharing of best practices) but better cooperation at the local level. 71 The Lisbon Treaty does however bring some substantial changes to the functioning of the EURATOM Treaty but concern mainly procedural and institutional provisions which do not concern us here. particularly consequential for high fixed-cost technology such as nuclear because the greater the fixed costs are, the greater price and quantity risks are in volatile energy markets. 74 However, long-term electricity contracts create severe risks of anti-competitive effects (e.g. foreclosure) and have become a focus of scrutiny for European and competition authorities. 75 As a result, market operators are left uncertain on how they can structure (e.g. on duration, exclusivity or use restrictions) long-term contracts, which increases market risk and creates a severe impediment to the nuclear renaissance.
Second, an inter se agreement could define robust legal and regulatory regime guiding nuclear investors on:
 the creation of joint ventures with other suppliers;  the use of "open season" mechanisms to booking their generating capacity to suppliers or to selling long-term energy contracts to industrial consumers;
 investment in merchant lines.
In the face of the different market risks investors face (e.g. volume and price risks, misalignment of contract incentives with potential buyers, under-development of European spot and forward markets) 76 some innovative contract structures such as consortium, joint ventures and collective buying schemes are increasingly considered and implemented (e.g. in Finland and France). 77 What is acceptable from a competition point of view remains much of a black hole which is detrimental for legal certainty. 78 The use of "open season" faces the same problem whereas it is a way to mitigate competition problems and market test demand. 79 fully or partially exempted from the rules on Third Party Access (thereafter TPA) and/or the rules on the use of the congestion rent. From the point of view of nuclear investors (and buyers involved in some of the hybrid contractual structures described above), investing in merchant lines in parallel to investing in nuclear capacities can have the advantage to secure sales abroad when regulated interconnectors are highly congested. 80 Overall, a robust market frame could provide a clearer view on what is presumably proand anti-competitive with long-term contracting, joint venture and possible exemptions of TPA in this area and therefore reduce the uncertainty surrounding investors, operators and business consumers interested in nuclear energy.
b. Legal Assessment
Competition policy (Art 101 -102 TFEU) is an exclusive competence of the Union (Art 3(1) TFEU) and EU competition rules do not exclude or exempt nuclear energy. 81 Therefore, EU competition rules apply to activities in the field of nuclear energy to the extent that they do not derogate from the provisions of the EURATOM Treaty. 82 The provisions of the EURATOM Treaty more closely linked to 'market frame' issues are Art 92 -100 EURATOM (Chapter 9 on "The Nuclear Common Market"). In Case 1/78 of the ECJ Draft IAEA Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Transports, the Court expressly clarified that the Commission has powers (shared competence) for the creation of a nuclear common market and stated that Chapter 9 of the EURATOM Treaty needs to be interpreted as an application of the general common market in the specialized field of nuclear energy: "In the field of supply and movement of nuclear materials the Commission is endowed with a number of prerogatives which are defined in detail by Articles 52 to 76 83 on the one hand and articles 92 to 100 on the other (..)" (para. 12). However, these provisions concern only "the goods and products specified in the lists forming Annex IV to this Treaty" (Art 92 EURATOM), i.e. primary fuel (uranium and its derivatives), whereas we need a more robust market frame regarding sales and transport of the energy produced from primary fuels (i.e. electricity).
As a result, most market frame issues (long-term energy contracts and joint venture) are under the jurisdiction of competition rules where the Commission enjoys exclusive competence. Several major cases have indeed been engaged by the Commission on energy long-term contracts in the last 5-10 years, e.g. Synergen, 84 Gas Natural/Endesa, 85 The Commission has made clear that its single energy market initiative will apply to nuclear energy in the same way as to any other and that a rigorous application of the relevant state aid 91 and competition rules implies a level playing field for all energy sources. To the extent that nuclear energy competes on an equal footing with other energy sources, free competition should not only be the rule between nuclear operators throughout the EU, but also between nuclear operators and other energy providers. Only the case of merchant lines deserves further legal analysis as it belongs to internal market rules (Art 26 and 114 TFEU), an area of shared competence (Art 4 TFEU). Regulators (ACER). In essence, this test is the effects test of EU competition law (Art 101(3) TFEU) carried out ex ante to provide more legal certainty for investors. 94 Further clarifying rules for nuclear investors would indeed not conflict with this objective. However, Art 7(1) is meant to be an 'exception test', namely that "the level of the risk is such that the investment would not take place unless the exemption is granted" and this is clearly something that has to be assessed case-by-case. In addition, Art 7(1) is a competition test and nuclear investors should not take advantage of clarified guidelines over other competitors. Last, without presuming on the extent of the 'occupation of the field' by means of Union law for the whole internal energy market, it seems clear that field pre-emption would exist at least on the precise scope covered the Art 7 of Regulation 714/2009. Overall, we believe that the possible improvements of the market frame we proposed could not be included in an inter se agreement. High level waste and spent fuel subject to direct disposal, which are the most hazardous radioactive waste, require long-term isolation and containment. It is internationally accepted that geological disposal represents the safest and most sustainable option for long-term management. 97 Progress on the implementation of such disposal projects is noted only in a few Member States, namely Finland, Sweden and France, and it is likely that these countries the inter-connector; (e) since the start of the European electricity liberalization, no part of the capital or operating costs of the inter-connector has been recovered from any component of the network tariffs; (f) the exemption is not to the detriment of competition or the effective functioning of the internal electricity market or the efficient functioning of the regulated systems to which the inter-connector is linked." 94 T. Van will have operational disposal facilities by 2025. 98 The remaining countries are less advanced. Many of them have not made such progress because of the political sensitivity of the issue or insufficient scientific, technical and financial resources. 99 Finland demonstrates that even small nuclear programs can afford their own national repository but in this case, the cooperation with the Swedish nuclear program has helped to reduce cos In order to reach economies of scale on the cost side, there are more and more multinational initiatives in support of national solutions through joint work, programs and knowledge transfer, as well as reflections on regional solutions. An inter se agreement could include provisions on disposal of high-level radio-active waste and spent nuclear fuel as well as the setting-up of regional centres for disposal.
Disposal of High-level
b. Legal Assessment
Contrary to general safety standards, the specific legal basis on disposal of high-level radio-active waste and spent nuclear fuel is currently very thin. General safety standards apply nevertheless. The existing safety standards have first been defined in the Council Directive 96/29/EURATOM which lays down basic safety standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiation. The Council Directive 2006/117/EURATOM 100 on the supervision and control of shipments of waste and spent fuel later complemented it. It provides for a compulsory and common system of notification and a standard control document for shipments of radioactive waste or spent fuel which have a point of departure, transit or destination in an EU Member State if the quantities or concentration are over certain limits fixed by Article 3(2)(a) and (b) of Directive 96/29/EURATOM. These Directives have recently been complemented by a more general Council Directive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community framework to define basic obligations on the safety of nuclear installations whilst strengthening the role of national regulatory bodies.
The management of spent fuel and radioactive waste has thus been addressed at the Union level through a variety of legislative instruments, but only for general radiation protection and environmental matters. The Court of Justice in its case law had indeed recognized that the Union shares competence with the Member States in matter of nuclear safety.
101 At present, waste management remains however a national responsibility with Community legislation only covering a small range of the issues involved, such as supervision and control of shipments of radioactive waste and spent fuel. 'Occupation of the field' can thus be considered almost non-existent. management of the nuclear waste and spent fuel within its jurisdiction, some choosing reprocessing of spent fuel, others aiming at final disposal of spent fuel with no other use foreseen." Cooperation on the disposal of high-level radio-active waste and spent nuclear fuel as well as the setting-up of regional centres for disposal can thus be considered close to being exclusive competence of Member States. There is thus no problem of pre-emption of Treaty-making competence. 102 We also note that such cooperation would also concur to the realization of EURATOM objectives, especially the "establishment of the basic installations necessary for the development of nuclear energy in the Community" (Art 2(c) EURATOM) . However, the safety standards set in Union law should be complied with in all cases to avoid conflict pre-emption. We note here that were the Commission to table effectively new legislative proposals on the treatment of nuclear waste by the end of 2010, as announced by president José Manuel Barroso in March 2010 at the OECD-hosted conference on civil nuclear power in Paris, an inter se agreement signed in between could be interpreted as creating obstacle pre-emption. The full legality test would then have to be run once the new (final) text is known.
In terms of discrimination on grounds of nationality, as long as foreign undertakings operating in one of the contracting Member States would not be precluded to use the new regional centre for disposal, primacy of Union law would be respected. In terms of distortion of competition within the internal market, the use of such regional repository can hardly be considered as 'hidden subsidy' to the nuclear industry, especially since the cost efficiencies would a priori be enjoyed by the Member States themselves and not by the undertakings. Lastly, the principle of subsidiarity does not appear to be a major problem, especially with regard to the fact that the Commission itself believes that regional cooperation could accelerate decision-making on definitive disposal solutions and that regional solutions are appealing in terms of economies of scale. Recital 15 of the Directive 2006/117 also recalls that "Member States should promote agreements between themselves in order to facilitate the safe and efficient management of radioactive waste or spent fuel from Member States that produced it in small quantities and where the establishment of appropriate facilities would not be justified from a radiological point of view." For the moment, these issues are addressed only by means of extensive consultations at the EU level, and especially in the European High Level Group on Nuclear Safety and Waste Management (ENSREG) and at the European Nuclear Energy Forum (ENEF). An inter se agreement involving waste disposal could thus be presented as an interim step to a Union-wide legislation. The Commission's 102 As long as Member States comply with their obligations under Article 37 EURATOM, which require them to provide 'general data' to the Commission on the site and surroundings of a planned facility in the course of national authorisation procedures for the operation of nuclear power plants, reprocessing facilities and storage facilities. We note that the Court in Cattenom interpreted Art 37 EURATOM as meaning that the Commission has to be provided with general data before a disposal of radioactive waste is authorized by the competent Member State and that the Commission's opinion must be brought to the attention of that State before the issue of any such authorization. The Commission thus assesses whether the planned installations are liable to lead to an exposure, significant from the point of view of health, of the members of the population of another Member State or to significant contamination of the water, soil or airspace of another Member State. On the basis of these notifications, the Commission has already drawn up a number of opinions, which pay special attention to the features of the site of the planned installations. A regional agreement on the management of high-level radio-active waste and spent nuclear fuel, including regional centres for disposal, appears as particularly suited for the approach we propose. The different directives on nuclear safety should of course be complied with, in particular the Member States' requirements to report periodically to the Commission.
A Common Framework for Reactor Design Assessment: Rationale and Legal Feasibility a. Content of the Proposition
In the framework of reactor design assessment, cooperation among the regulators of the Member States could be promoted in an inter se agreement. Although there is movement in Europe towards harmonised requirements for licensing, reactor design certification is done nationally.
103 If a design has been assessed and certified by one national regulatory authority, replication of efforts does not optimise the licensing process. 104 As the national safety requirements tend to converge, it is natural for the different authorities to mutually converge in their assessment as well. The resulting standardization of reactor designs would greatly contribute to reinforcing the licensing process and making it more effective.
Harmonizing licensing issues is a good way of ensuring that industry can evolve in a stable legal and regulatory framework. Fleets of standardized nuclear power plants offer, in general, the potential for increased safety trough operational excellence, higher availability and capacity factors and improved maintenance efficiency. 105 A greater convergence and harmonization of national standards on reactor design assessment would also allow for increased international cooperation among regulators, for example by sharing methods and data arising from safety evaluation. As to reactor design and technology, utilities are already choosing among fairly standardized designs offered by a small number of vendors. These vendors operate worldwide and, in line with the concept of standardization and its obvious advantages, should prefer to get design changes shared by a larger set of users. 106 Overall, common reactor design assessment for new builds (and mutual recognition) could be promoted through inter se agreement.
b. Legal Feasibility
As for the management of nuclear waste and spent fuel, the assessment of reactor designs is only subject to the common safety requirements of the Directive 2009/71/EURATOM (on the basis of Art 2(b) and 30 EURATOM). Union legislation does not go further with harmonization and does not include any reciprocity mechanism for design approval. The problem of pre-emption is also largely the same as in the previous section. Competences are shared on safety requirements but Member States retain exclusive competence (and responsibility) over reactor design assessment, in line with established principles of international law. However, to be legal a common licensing scheme with a mutual recognition mechanism should not conflict with the safety objectives of the EURATOM Treaty. We note also that a predictable and harmonized licensing framework overseen by an independent regulatory authority is the keystone for the achievement of nuclear safety. An inter se agreement would therefore not raise a problem of pre-emption.
The problem of primacy of Union law might at first appear more complicated to solve. However, giving different answers in different countries does not only lead to a lack of predictability but also to a distortion of competition. Free competition in this part of the supply chain is a stated objective of the EURATOM Treaty as Art 2(g) states that the Union should "ensure wide commercial outlets and access to the best technical facilities by the creation of a common market in specialized materials and equipment". To achieve the necessary confidence and a level-playing field, the licensing framework must ensure that regulatory decisions are aligned across Europe. As a result, harmonization among a few Member States on the licensing processes, it is submitted, is a natural obstacle to discrimination on ground of nationality. However, it could be considered that undertakings already operating in Member States parties to the inter se agreement would benefit from an undue advantage compared to 'outsiders', even though it would still be an improvement compared to the current situation. As it is purely a problem of harmonization and that discrimination might occur, it might be argued that Union law should be favoured in the name of subsidiarity. However, in view of the very long and contentious process leading to the Nuclear Safety Directive, it is submitted that Union law could better be used to consolidate the future acquis of an inter se agreement and not initiate harmonization of reactor design assessment itself. 
Conclusion
The nuclear industry currently has a general need for planning stability and reduction of investment risks coming from regulatory and market uncertainty. As for the latter, it appears that an inter se agreement would not be legal as market issues in the new competitive paradigm are already heavily regulated, not the least by EU competition law. However, this section has shown that common approaches at the sub-Union level are possible concerning in particular the licensing process. Harmonization and simplification of licensing procedures are critical in order to provide legal robustness and certainty. In particular, we have shown that common approaches would be possible on the management of radio-active waste and spent nuclear fuel, the setting-up of regional repositories and common design certification. We have seen that despite the many areas of exclusive competence of Member States, there is a strong rationale for continuous action at the Union level, in particular on safety under EURATOM and on competition and state aid under the Lisbon Treaty. There is also a natural role for the Commission to enhance public awareness on e.g. factual accounts of the operating history of nuclear facilities, enact a roadmap for European nuclear energy and spread good practices. European solidarity for the fulfilment of closure commitment in Central and Eastern European countries will also continue. The Commission holds a limited power of regulatory oversight but it exists nevertheless. Any international law agreement between Member States should thus recognize the continuous rights of the Commission. However, in view of the tensions raised by the debate on the future of EURATOM in the context of the discussions on the Lisbon Treaty, it seems that an inter se agreement on nuclear cooperation could be a way to go forward in the targeted areas described above.
IV. Towards Short-Run Differentiation in Gas Security of Supply Governance
High energy prices, the occurrence of regional supply shortfalls and first of all, the increasing reliance on imports from third countries is reason for unsettling concern. In fact, it is anticipated that by 2030, up to 70 % of the EU's natural gas consumption would have to be imported. 107 Notwithstanding such anticipation and the likely or unlikely associated consequences, European regulation addressing gas security of supply is not abundant. Security of gas supply policy basically happens at the national level. The different domestic preferences are embodied in the gas contracts and political preferences which are the prerogative of the Member States. 108 The actually existing EU energy policy in this area is comprised of a visible internal market policy and, at this stage, a vocal but inconsistent 107 "Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply", Green common supply security policy. 109 The main challenges to such a policy at European level are political, both internally and externally. The reluctance of Member States to accept the idea of pooling their gas markets has been so strong that efforts to obtain their consent was doomed to fail for many years. The first success only occurred in 1998 with the creation of the directive on common rules for the internal market in natural gas. 110 This pooling together being a new phenomenon, attention was however exclusively centred on securing an efficient and well-functioning internal energy market in the expectation that such a market would eventually lead to a secure framework for energy supply. 111 It was the initial Loyola de Palacio's push for a security of supply directive, adopted in April 2004 112 that finally brought the change. The British U-turn at the Hampton Court European Summit in October 2005, after the governments had so far resisted all initiatives to co-ordinate energy policy at European level, as well as the first Russia-Ukraine 113 gas dispute, also played a role. 114 The most recent trigger for the renewed interest has of course been the RussianUkrainian gas crisis of 2009 that revealed several shortcomings of the existing legislation. The new Treaty provision on energy Article 194 para 1 lit (b) introduced by the Lisbon Treaty continues along the same lines of the institutional fine-tuning. Down to the present day the issue of (gas) security of supply went through a gradual legislation of EU energy policy: from a collection of general per definitionem "non-energy" provisions, such as those on the internal market (ex-Article 95 EC), on competition (ex-Article 81-88 EC) or on trans-European networks (ex-Art 154 EC) to a finally explicit provision for the energy sector including security of supply which invites the EU explicitly to establish those measures necessary to achieve security of supply.
Due to the heterogeneous energy situations of the Member States and the fact that each Member State government refers to security of supply considerations when taking decisions on the national fuel mix, it is unlikely that the EU will be able to develop a coherent common policy on obtaining secure energy supplies in the near future. 115 In order to meet the multitude of interests, differences in energy dependence and energy mix and to overcome the complexity of decision-making in this area, a new decision-making framework could be established by means of differentiation that would allow progress to be made by those Member States that are able to agree on common actions with regard to natural gas supply. 123 However, under the fierce and heavy pressure of Member States the idea was reduced to Member States having the prerogative to define their respective energy policy and to choose their respective mix of energy sources while being aware of the risk of gas supply, plus to mitigate such risks in the context of their national energy policies. It ended with Member States having countless unchecked and noncooperative options. 124 The organization of an emergency frame by those Member States participating in the envisaged agreement in the form of defining national emergency plans, checked by the regulatory authorities for their consistency at the regional level is considerable. It would be checked if market operation rules permitted markets to play their role of "first line crisis mechanism" which requires a minimum level of operation transparency and a minimum level of harmonisation among countries, regulators, hubs and TSOs. The definition of a solidarity mechanism could be used at the regional level among the participating Member States alongside with common regulations on how it will be financed ex ante and paid on use. 
b. Legal Feasibility
The projected establishment of emergency plans by means of an inter se agreement meets the same obstacle like the projected transparency mechanism: there is a broad occupation of the field by EU law. Subject to an area of shared competence, field occupation leads to a limitation of the Member States' treaty-making competence with regard to emergency plans. The still valid 2004/67 Gas Security of Supply Directive already contained in its Art. 8 the obligation for the Member States to prepare in advance and publish national emergency measures, it provided for the adoption and publication of national emergency provisions. Even though the established mechanism has proven to be insufficient in the event of a supply crisis in 2009 this does not change the extent of field occupation. The inefficient results were caused by non-or uncoordinated harmonization across the 27 Member States. Despite this, the new Regulation repealing the 2004 Gas Security Directive which is expected by mid 2010 126 provides for a detailed content of the emergency plans of the Member States and the Commission will be equipped with broad powers. The content of the plan is detailed in the proposal and includes inter alia a definition of the role of each of the relevant parties, the procedures to be followed in the event of a crisis and inter-State cooperation mechanisms. According to Art. 9 (1) and (2) of the proposed regulation, three crisis levels are established: "early warning", "alert" and "emergency". The emergency level for EU action is reached "when an exceptionally high demand occurs or when there is a disruption of the supply through or from the largest infrastructure or source and there is a credible risk that the supply standard to protect customers can no longer be met with market based instruments alone". The Commission can verify "whether the declaration of an Emergency is justified and whether it does not impose an undue burden on the natural gas undertakings and on the functioning of the internal market". It can ask the competent authority to modify or even lift the measure in the event that it imposes an undue burden or is unjustified, Art 9(6). Moreover, the Commission may even declare a Community emergency at the request of one competent authority, specifying the geographical scope of the measure. Its primary task is to coordinate the actions of the competent authorities, in which it is to be assisted by the Gas Coordination Group Art. 10 (1).
The same applies with regard to the establishment of a common solidarity mechanism at regional level. The current 2004 Directive already dealt with Member States cooperation 127 and the expected 2010 Regulation explicitly provides for a specification of Member States solidarity in applying this principle in times of crisis. Supply crisis is defined as a situation where the necessary volumes cannot be obtained in the internal market. Thus, Member States' solidarity is not only required in the event of a supply crisis understood as a shortterm transportation failure but also understood as a market failure. It cannot even be excluded that solidarity also encompasses cases of failed negotiations with exporters (see Art. 3 No. 2 of the proposed Regulation "the Member States shall cooperate with each other to prevent supply disruptions and to limit dangers in case it occurs"). 128 Based on solidarity the Member States or the EU will take a part of the burden caused by a supply crisis either directly by purchase of volumes or transportation capacity, or indirectly by aid to needy Member States or compensation of third parties.
All efforts to enhance security of supply policy at European level need to bear in mind that the EU has no responsibility for the availability of goods on the market, thus not for adequate gas supplies. 129 This lies only with the Member States according to their constitutions. Even with the new energy provision, security of supply is only an aim for the internal market rules and not a responsibility of the Union. Article 122 TFEU (ex Article 100 EC) on undertaking activities at the time of the shortage of supply, only provides for regulations that can come into play only when the internal market has collapsed or is about to collapse. 130 Thus, the existing and nascent legislation pre-empts any agreement falling within their scopes. The Member States are precluded from concluding agreements containing 127 The establishment of genuine solidarity between Member States in major emergency supply situations is essential, even more so as Member States become increasingly interdependent regarding security of supply. 128 A. R. Boerner, "A critical evaluation of the new proposal for an EC gas supply security regulation", 7 OGEL 2009, p. 23. 129 Börner, above note 7, p. 29. 130 Which in our case of market areas fully integrated by infrastructure would be a total collapse, see R. Börner, above note 7, p. 26. lacking almost completely. The Member States make bilateral deals with major energy suppliers without informing the Commission or the other Member States, thereby putting the cohesiveness and the credibility of the EU energy external policy into question. 137 This lack of transparency inside the EU is also used by third party countries against the EU, in particular with respect to the pricing of gas in different EU Member States. Unlike with the signing of particular bilateral deals with the USA on air transportation access ('open skies), the EU has not mounted any legal challenge against the Member States and has not yet asked the European Court of Justice to step in, which however remains a possible way forward for the Commission. 138 In order to secure gas supply the establishment of a coherent approach among Member States towards major supplier countries is needed a "common voice" i.e. a coordination and information mechanism for bilateral actions, arrangements and contracts based on a high level of transparency.
With regard to the external dimension, the situation is difficult for a Schengen-like approach understood as an agreement among Member States as we touch upon exclusive competences of the Union. Generally those cases where the Union can act externally derive either explicitly from the treaty, are implied from those provisions or derive from secondary internal legislation based on those provisions. 139 If we look at the usual bilateral energy agreements concluded between Member States and third countries at least some of the aspects covered are the exclusive competence of the EU. In fact, the Union (and pre-Lisbon: the Community) possesses the external competence to "speaking with one voice" which covers the conclusion of agreements with third countries. 140 Relevant policy on the matter is on the one hand the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) of Article 207 TFEU (ex 133 EC Treaty). 141 It provides for a coherent external trade regulation at EU level. The CCP does not only stand for the coordination of national policies or an obligation to cooperate with the Member States, but as a task of the Union. However Member States rarely hesitate to foster an autonomous commercial policy despite the competence of the Union. Pre-Lisbon, this Union exclusive competence was limited to trading in goods. In other areas such as investments, the provision of services or when non-trade matters were involved, the cooperation of nuclear regulators in new licensing issues is possible in the short-term. Some initiatives of these regulators already exist, as the Multinational Design Evaluation Program, which shows the relevance and timeliness of the issue. Common changes and harmonization of the regulatory and licensing legal framework could occur quickly if a few Member States could agree on an inter se agreement. A number of EU countries considering new build have already taken steps to adapt their framework, for instance Italy and the UK. Such steps should be coordinated and best practice examples should be followed. More efficient, more predictable and more harmonized licensing regimes are vital for investment decisions. Given the very particular and contentious nature of the nuclear technology, a legally-binding cooperation device could be useful.
The internal dimension of gas security of supply is an area which is exhaustively covered by EU legislation. Even though it would be beneficial to establish transparency, emergency or solidarity mechanisms at a regional level, the comprehensive regulation at EU level pre-empt the Member States from concluding inter se agreements in this area. Of course deeper regional cooperation is possible in the lose frame of regional initiatives. With regard to the external dimension a Schengen-like agreement excluding the EU will not be possible as the objectives to be regulated touch upon areas of exclusive Union competence. As a consequence only a so-called mixed agreement appears to be the best possible solution. Such a solution outside the EU institutional framework would in addition give the Member States a possibility to limit a further expansion of the EU's external competences (as developed gradually by the ECJ and now constitutionalized with the Lisbon Treaty).
As a general result, Schengen-like agreements are not legally feasible in every area of EU energy policy. The actual legal feasibility depends on the development of Union law which in turn often depends on the willingness of Member States to transfer competences at the Union level. This sets the limits and also the opportunities for such agreements. Overall, such inter se agreements seem to be the right sort of legal framework in certain targeted areas of energy policy where we would like to see a more European policy to go forward.
Finally, even if the primacy of EU law might be an insurmountable obstacle in some areas of energy policy where the legislation is already comprehensive, the current political realities might act as a facilitator for the implementation of inter se agreements. The unification of energy law is indeed an inherently political subject and any attempt by the Commission to prevent the Member States from concluding international law agreements or to fight their legality under EU law might be seen as an intolerable intrusion within their real (or perceived) exclusive prerogatives.
